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Border Threats and Insecurity in Nigeria

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Lawal A. Bakare PhD

Department of Public Administration

Osun State University Osogbo

lawal.bakare@uniosun.edu.ng

Abstract

Nigeria is both the most populous and the richest country and this incontrovertibly makes her a point of destination for citizens of neighbouring countries. Worrisomely, the movements of the migrants into Nigeria are without proper documentation, as many of them explore illegal routes into the country, thus, escaping routine immigrants' checks at the border posts by officials of the institutions in charge of border management in Nigeria. This study provided background information on the border porosity and human security in Ibarapa Community of Oyo State Nigeria. It explicated the thread of border porosity, light arms proliferation and human security along Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria and investigated the challenges of border porosity and human security in the study area. Investigating the consequences of these challenges became significant because border porosity are still very susceptible to numerous arms proliferations emanating from poor mismanagement of the borders by the states bordering Nigeria and Nigeria herself. The influx of unchecked and undocumented migrants has continued to pose unsalutary effects on Nigeria's national security as many foreigners were fingered as mercenaries in the recent Fulani herders and farmers conflicts in some part of Ibarapa Community in Oyo State Nigeria. Also, it is interesting to know that some members of Fulani herders while having their houses on one side of the community across the Ibarapa communities, they simultaneously have their farmlands on the other side of the thick bushes across the communities, which makes their daily activities sometimes illegal. Therefore, guarding a country's borders is an extremely important job that must be given top priority in order to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens.

Keywords: Border, Threat, Security, Globalisation, Herders

Introduction

The need for border security now assumes heightened importance in the world today due to increase in crimes and act of terrorism. Ultimately, border security and management constitutes a main factor of concern in tackling security challenges in any country of the World, most especially on the issues of arms smuggling and act of terrorism (Frowd, 2018). In most countries of the world, either the developed and developing country, security has become a front burner issue; the nature and characteristics of the Nigeria border management with neighboring countries are poor demarcation and naming thereby making them porous.

The existence of border porosity is as old as the entity called Nigeria. It however became more pronounced in the 80s, and 90s, though with little empirical evidence. Most recently, border porosity no doubt have grown in scope and often characterised by various forms of criminal markets like large-scale financial frauds, arms proliferation, human trafficking, and cybercrimes among others related crimes. The unprecedented effects of illegal movements of arms in circulation made their control one of the most important security priorities of the Nigeria government (Garcial, 2019).

Arms proliferation control have become a crucial issue of global discourse and action. When arms are not controlled: they are seen as a potential threat to human security and antidevelopment tools to international and sub-regional security, and sustainable development of man and society. Nigeria government has not only acknowledged the illegal arms proliferation; it has also been striving to combat the menace of illicit proliferation of arms particularly in the border communities across the neighbouring nations that share boundaries with Nigeria. To this end, existing studies, such as (Opanike, Adeloju & Adenipekun, 2015; Mobolaji & Alabi, 2017) among others, revealed that proliferation of arms at border communities, in a modern society, have been a major phenomenon distracting the continuous growth in relation between countries. This is because countries with varying levels of socio-economic, political, and cultural growths are merged in some kinds of regional structure and this has aided the facilitation of human security that promote growth and development among the nations.

The menace of proliferation of arms has become intense that it portends threats to border communities and human security (Opanike et al., 2015). In view of the threat of border crimes such as arms proliferation at border communities, generally governments of countries of the world and in specifically, Nigeria government in response to the insecurity challenges established security architectures to address the challenges of border porosity and arms proliferation. The specific role of these security agencies is to stem the tide of border crimes such as arms proliferation and it's infiltrating impact on the human security. However, despite the security apparatus, border porosity is on the increase. The cumbersome nature of the problem could be identified in the complexity of the border porosity, as well as threats it created for human security at the border communities and the nation at large (Shelly, 2020).

Recently, Nigeria has emerged as a new hotspot for all forms of cross-border violence, from human trafficking to internet fraud, arms smuggling and smuggling, among other (Opanike et al., 2015). These actions have a tendency to wreak havoc on the security measures that have notably been put in place by the different security agencies at various border communities. The porous border, for example, has made it easier for offenders to operate with less difficulty. Despite the presence of security agencies, arms proliferation at border communities is continuously rising and it remains a major problem to the security condition in the country and borderline communities.

The porosity of border between Nigeria and Benin republic has aid border criminality arising from arms proliferation have remarkably increased since 2003, resulting in international robbery and related criminal activities threatening the security of lives in the affected communities and as such leading to multi-dimensional influence of border shut-downs on the Nigerian side (Sossou-Agbo, 2016). Particularly along the Ibarapa corridor of Iseyin town, armed attacks as well as arms proliferation, are rampart and the border is also known for the smuggling of drugs, small arms, and light ammunition on their way to Nigeria or Ghana (Subair, 2021).

However, despite the presence of multiple security outposts in the Ibarapa corridor, the spate of arms proliferation at the border communities persists. Furthermore, the challenges of arms proliferation at Nigerian border communities are under-researched, particularly given the current trend in international insecurity (Bello, Agunyai & Amusan, 2022). Hence, this study investigates the effect of border porosity and human security in Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarification

Border

The realisation that borders represent complex social and territorial phenomena has had a profound impact on the study of borders. The concept of border underpins the arrangement of, and indeed the very condition of possibility for, both domestic and international legal and political systems (Sandor, 2016). Domestically, it is integral to conventional notions of the limits of internal sovereignty and authority, reflected in Max Weber's paradigmatic definition of the

state as a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory. Border serves two basic purposes protection from external and internal threats and territorial determination (Newman, 2003). According to Zartman (2010), borders run across land but through people. On maps they appear as fine one-dimensional lines, whereas on the ground they have many dimensions. Borderlands are boundaries in depth, space around a line, the place where state meets society, and where no one ever feels at home (Sossou-Agbo, 2016). In human terms, it is impossible to understand borders, and indeed the peripheral relations between the states and societies they contain without understanding how it is to live along them (Zartman, 2010).

Borders are diversified in terms of the components that form the boundaries themselves (Mark, & Iwebi, 2019). There are various methods (or techniques) that neighbouring states use to describe their political borders. And, in practice, more than one of them may be employed on different sectors of a single boundary. According to Mark, and Iwebi, (2019), technically, most of the international borders of the world can be classified into three categories: natural, artificial and cultural.

- 1. Natural borders are those that follow natural geographic features, such as rivers, mountain ranges, estuaries and the like. Examples include much of the border between the United States and Mexico which follows the Rio Grande and the border between France and Spain which follows the Pyrenees mountain range. Because of their importance to military defence, mountains, rivers, lakes, seas, bays and straits have been usually adopted by territorial rulers to serve as political borders. Natural borders create a clear dividing line between two states, offer a buffer of security (or at least the appearance thereof), often do not require active patrolling border guards, and historically have been more difficult to dispute than borders less easily identifiable by a physical landmark. Sometimes natural boundaries, however, can present neighbouring states with problems of precision in demarcation, delimitation, or both.
- 2. Geometric borders (also known as a straight-line border) are those that are formed either by straight lines drawn on a map or nautical chart or by lines that follow the curves of latitude. International borders in the Middle East and North America are often based on such geometry. The most commonly used geometrical approach is latitude/longitude lines. The cartographic principle specifies the territory of the homeland by reference to cartographical conventions and

maps. For instance, the countries of North Korea and South Korea are divided by the Demilitarized Zone (DM/) along the 38th parallel, an area regarded as the most heavily fortified border in the world.

3. Cultural borders are those that follow or approximate the boundaries between the homelands of different ethnicities, language groups and other cultural communities. They often date from before the modern era, and can often be the result of successive military struggles over the centuries. Many international borders in Africa more or less follow such cultural divisions, including the border between Nigeria and Benin Republic. Cross-border disputes often stem from common errors and intricacies in boundary description. Without clear definitions and/or bilateral (and, if necessary, multilateral) agreements concerning political boundaries, disputes might arise.

Border Porosity

Border porosity is defined in a general term as the leakage or break of the border that allows the illegal and unofficial migration of people goods and ammunitions from one country to another. The emergence of border porosity expanded more especially with the emergence of globalization (Guo & Guo, 2015). The emergence of globalisation encouraged the opening of borders of countries of the world, and thus, countries have a different political, cultural, and socio-economic sphere that emerged together to form regional arrangements and other transnational activities. The history of border porosity in Africa can be traced back to the time of the colonial administration, and the second administration that is; during the political independence of African countries. Before the independence of African countries, Africa was more of establishing a sphere of influence for political and economic purpose than the creation of boundary, but colonial administration demarcated the boundaries with no respect to sociocultural basic of African people, and no explanations why African people were scattered across borders (Akinyemi, 2013). Though, the end of the Cold War saw the emergence of a new phenomenon in the international community; featuring among the list of such evolving issues is the phenomenon of porous borders and the recurring crimes associated with it. This poses serious threats to global peace and security. The dimensions and momentum of trans-border crimes have increased with the emergence of globalization (Sandor, 2016). This also encouraged the opening

of borders among the countries of the world. Thus, countries with varying degrees of development in socio-economic, political and cultural spheres are merged together in one form of regional arrangement or the other and this has further helped in facilitating the activities of transnational criminal activities (Opanike & Aduloju, 2015).

2.1.1.3 Border Control

Borders define a country's sovereignty by determining its territory, and where its administration and jurisdiction ends. Borders also assign national identities. A nation-state's boundaries puts people under one entity, define their lifestyles, national culture including language, destiny, privileges (e.g., right to vote, enjoy welfare benefits and certain rights denied non-citizens) and so on.

Border controls are measures taken by a country or a bloc of countries to monitor its borders in order to regulate the movement of people, animals and goods. Most countries have some form of border control to restrict or limit the movement of people, animals and goods into or out of the country. In order to cross borders people need passports and visas or other appropriate forms of identification. To stay or work within a country's borders, foreigners usually need special immigration documents or permits that authorise them to do so. Moving goods across a border often requires the payment of excise tax, often collected by customs officials. Also, animals (and occasionally humans) moving across borders may need to go into quarantine to prevent the spread of exotic or infectious diseases. Most countries prohibit carrying illegal drugs or endangered animals across their borders. For the purposes of border control, apart from land borders, airports and seaports are also classified as borders. According to Vogeler (2010), international land borders can be classified into soft and hard borders. Soft borders, where people and goods are allowed to pass through with few checks, include open and regulated and controlled frontiers. Hard borders have stricter control and have fortified borders. These include wire fenced borders; wire fenced and walled borders; walled borders; and militarised borders.

Table 1: Types of International Borders

Soft Borders		Hard Borders		
Open	Regulated	Fenced	Walled	

 USA-Mexico USA-Canada European	USA-MexicoUSA-Canada	 USA-Mexico Most fortified borders 	 USA- Mexico Isreali- Palestine Maginot line Hardin's Wall China Wall
most borders • Ghana-Togo			• China Wall

Source: Vogeler (2010)

METHODOLOGY

This study employs mixed method design incorporating both qualitative and quantitative data obtained through interview, desktop document analysis and questionnaire administration. A total of four hundred residents of border area in Ibarapa Local Government of Oyo State were purposively selected for questionnaire purpose while officials of the Nigeria Custom Service and traditional rulers were selected for interview purpose. Content analysis of the document and thematic analysis of responses were conducted on qualitative data while descriptive analysis was conducted on quantitative data.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIN

Border Threats and Insecurity in Nigeria

Nigeria because of its largest size geographically, shares large borders with its neighboring African states, particularly to the West African region. Nigeria from Benin republic, shares (773) kilometers, from her border with the Niger Republic, which shares (1497) kilometers, from the Chad border it shares (87) kilometers, and from Cameroon border it shares (1690) kilometers (Babatola, 2015). The porosity of these borders shared with most especially Benin Republic post a lot of challenges and security threat to the people of Ibarapa community and Nigeria nation at large. The porousness of these borders have led to series of challenges to Nigerian national security. For instance, humans are not new to trafficking. It is an ancient practice that has changed overtime from bondage to its current state. Before it was criminalised in 2000 under the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, including Women and Children, known as the Palermo Protocol, the scourge noticed that the international

community was being criminalised. Since then, concerns of trafficking in persons among researchers and professionals have gained traction largely because of the increased political understanding of the threats and the deaths of victims incurred by the violence.

However, Nigeria's porous borders with Niger Republic was used as slaves transit by smugglers who smuggle young girls into Europe. Nigeria is also the wealthiest and most populated in West Africa and Nigeria dwarfs all of these countries in terms of fiscal, demographic, and military ability. This explains the reasons why crises like political unrest, drought, and diseased conditions in neighbouring countries break over Nigeria because they rely exclusively on Nigeria. The former President of Nigeria also demonstrated this in Babangida's address, saying that no one is willing to profit from any sub-region's economic failure. This means Nigeria's national safety as illustrated in both the breadth and scale of cross-border smuggling operations, which are achieved in its everyday contact, represents the safety and security of its immediate neighbours.

Moreover, convergence and co-operation are essential during the 21st century which is marked by globalisation, until the current global order loses us out. The challenges get more difficult and demand a new solution as globalisation develops. In these circumstances we cannot rest on our quest for peace on our Nigerian national boundaries, or else the world remains hostile and insecure to the citizens of Nigeria (Adeolu & Fayomi). According to Akinyemi (2013), the irony is that the boundaries of western Africa are not sufficiently protected by the military. The smugglers live across the border and are familiar with routes more than attached military forces who are solely responsible for managing the borders areas.

The boundary porosity has also strengthened unlawful commercial interactions such as the trade of human beings, arms proliferation, and drug trafficking among others. The porosity of the African borders seems to be encouraging continuous action of arms proliferation, human trafficking, as well as lack of adequate protection and identification structures. The high poverty levels in the neighbouring countries are also compounding the border porosity challenges in Nigeria. Nigeria is now a hot spot of trade of human beings, arms proliferation, where smugglers benefit from the absence of successful monitoring, safety, and identification schemes. Visas are obtained by fraudulent means or by forgery, often in conjunction with agents of immigration.

Another notable feature is the cross-border connectivity as well as the porous nature. When European interests redrew national borders unilaterally in the late nineteenth century,

ethnic groups were fragmented. This arbitrary existence has resulted in cross-border linkage (Eveslage, 2013). As a result, a background analysis of this linkage can be traced back to the development of ethnolinguistic relationships between peoples such as Nigeria and the Niger Republic in the north, as well as Nigeria and the Benin Republic in the south.

AUBP (2013) asserts that most parts of the African continent especially Nigeria are characterised by insecurity, underdevelopment and conflict. Some of the fundamental causes of these problems are cross-border criminalities which range from cattle rustling, automobile theft, and smuggling of arms, ammunition and commodities, human trafficking, terrorism among others. This is because, even in the face of globalisation and technological advancement, borders in Africa aside from being largely porous, are often managed by limited personnel that are ill-equipped, illtrained and unmotivated to prevent cross-border crimes and to facilitate harmonious interactions between countries as a result of the mismanagement of these borders. This situation has, therefore, nearly perpetually opened the borders to transnational crimes because illicit activities carried out across the African borders daily thrive to the extent of becoming established across various sub-regions of Africa and Nigeria in particular. These challenges pose a lot 'headache' to the institutions that are managing illegal routes in Nigeria, which can be viewed in two forms namely those that emanate from the service itself and from outside the service which could be within the Nigerian state and as well as beyond the shores of Nigeria.

The foregoing reinforces Akinyemi's (2019) assertion that in West Africa, Nigeria is both the most populous and the richest country and this incontrovertibly makes her a point of destination for citizens of neighbouring countries. Worrisomely, the movements of the migrants into Nigeria are without proper documentation, as many of them explore illegal routes into the country, thus, escaping routine immigrants' checks at the border posts by officials of the institutions in charge of border management in Nigeria. The influx of unchecked and undocumented migrants has continued to pose unsalutary effects on Nigeria's national security as many foreigners were fingered as mercenaries in the recent Fulani herders and farmers conflicts in some part of Ibarapa Community in Oyo State Nigeria. Also, it is interesting to know that some members of Fulani herders while having their houses on one side of the community across the Ibarapa communities, they simultaneously have their farmlands on the other side of the thick bushes across the communities, which makes their daily activities sometimes illegal (Osimen et al, 2018).

Therefore, manning the borders of a country entails securing and warding off all elements inimical to the state and its populace at large and so this makes it a serious task that needs to be taken with uttermost priority.

The Imperative of Nigerian Border Control

As a boundary delineates the territory of two independent nations, it is the responsibility of both nations to protect their respective borders. Cooperativism can be defined in large part by the fact that each state decides for itself what measures it will take to protect its borders and how it will take them.

However, one of the current best practises in border management is the accurate definition of borderlines. A lack of unambiguous demarcation and differentiation between autonomous states, as argued by Seniora and Poitevin (2013), can lead to friction between them and, by extension, their neighbours. Inferring from this, accurate border demarcation enables border guards to efficiently administer borders and, more importantly, it guarantees long-term peace between states that share boundaries. The implementation of cutting-edge communication technologies is yet another example of a contemporary best practise in border control. These communication devices can be used to cover the flanks through which illegal migration occurs at borders and comprise sensors, alert systems, and surveillance cameras. Technology, as Marenin (2010) emphasises, is crucial to border control. This includes the collection, exchange, and use of data for purposes such as risk assessment, surveillance, and detection. Technological means and the usage of databases are superior to the antiquated practise of physical checking by border guards (Gerstein, et al., 2018) when it comes to border control.

Jancsics (2019) agreed, arguing that it is important to assess the role of the human factor in guarding the borders as vital stakeholders in national security even as states make provisions for the physical infrastructure needed for border management. It was determined in the autumn of 2020 that the rottenness and irregularities around the borders are in large part due to the low welfare package for border security officers. He cited inadequate pay as an example of an issue that discourages and frustrates border patrol agents. According to Hills (2020), border patrol agents' monthly salaries are far lower than the bribes offered by smugglers to cross the border

undetected. It's possible that border patrol agents might fall for this and either turn a blind eye or be otherwise unable to prevent the illegal activity. The outcome is a rise in debauchery along the frontiers. The government's ability to prioritise the welfare of its officers by paying them what they are owed, when they are owed it, will naturally motivate them to do their jobs effectively and reject any spoils or bribes being offered to them by transnational criminals, and if properly monitored, will go a long way towards discouraging transnational criminal activity.

The challenges of border porosity and human security in Nigeria: the case of Ibarapa Community of Oyo State

The safety of the people in the Ibarapa area is at jeopardy due to the free movement of people and weapons. The terrible truth that Nigeria's borders are incredibly porous is staring everyone square in the face. It's puzzling that no government has done much to address this issue over the years (Punch, 3 March 2022). The government's inaction is especially troubling given evidence that illegal arms proliferation has been aided by the porous borders, especially in the northeast, southwest, and northwest, and that criminals from all over the world can easily enter the country without being stopped.

Constant attacks on border communities, particularly Ibarapa communities and villages in Oyo state, can be traced back to a combination of factors, including government inaction, official corruption, and the lack of modern technology for border management. Human security is a big issue in the Ibarara village of Oyo state, as reported by both Fulani herders and host populations. The majority of the Fulani in the Oyo State town of Ibarapa are recent arrivals from the country's northern regions. Chad, Niger, the Benin Republic, and Cameroon all supply a tiny percentage. They like to establish communities far from the host populations. Fulani people first started showing up in Ibarapa at the turn of the twentieth century. The males tend to the herds while the women run the dairy farms and market their goods. Men and women alike work the fields and run their own businesses. Some people engage in multiple types of economic activity. The Barugu'en and the Bororo'en are two of the Fulani clans who live in Ibarapa. Even though they share a common language—the Fulani tongue of Fulfulde—their dialects are distinct.

While Fulani settlers have lived in Ibarapa for decades, their status as migrants and the resulting tensions with their host communities have limited their use of the city's infrastructure. This is

relevant to comprehending the recent conflict between communities and villages in Ibarapa and Fulani settlers. Cattle intrude on farmlands, leading to frequent conflicts between herders and farmers in Ibarapa, causing a thinning of goodwill between host populations and the Fulani. When cows eat crops that farmers have worked hard to grow, it often means the end of their livelihood. Many farmers reported that herders had broken demarcating hedges, raped women, abducted individuals at gunpoint, and in the worst cases, killed people on farms, set fire to buildings and stores, and used weapons. Some farmers said they had poured poison on their farmland in revenge for the cattle's incursion, killing off the cows. Cattle are highly prized, therefore when farmers treat them roughly, cattle herders often strike back. This historical context shed light on incidents that have occurred between locals and Fulani herders in the Ibarapa town of Oyo state, Nigeria.

There has been tension between farmers and Fulani herders in the Ibarapa hamlet for some time. Allegations of rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, and murder in the communities and villages contributed to the tensions between Farmers and Fulani herders in the Ibarapa community. Similar accusations were made by farmers and inhabitants of Igangan and other Ibarapa settlements. The son of a prominent Fulani chieftain was arrested for criminal activity by police in Igboora, a town in the Ibarapa region (Punch, February 18, 2021). Some Fulani people have stated that not all Fulani are criminals, yet this does not exonerate the Fulani of the charges against them. They also said that the Bororo (a Fulani clan) was responsible for many of the farm encroachments and other crimes they had experienced. It is commonly believed that the Bororo Fulani are responsible for many of the violent acts commonly associated with the Fulani people. They tend to move around a lot and are thus hard to track down and hold responsible for anything. A prominent Fulani voice has spoken out, saying that the majority of criminals in Nigeria are fellow Fulani who have entered the country illegally via Chad, Niger, Cameroon, or the Benin Republic's porous borders. A Yoruba traditional elder also said that the Fulani were able to commit crimes with impunity because they were hired by some locals to help raise their cattle. He also argued that the formerly effective method of mediating conflicts between the Fulani and the host communities—requiring the owners of livestock that destroy farmlands and crops to pay reparations to the harmed farmers—was losing favour. The Fulani increasingly prefer to report problems to law enforcement. The police, meanwhile, have been accused of siding with the Fulani. This has further strained relations between the Fulani herder and the local population. The Ibarapa community's ongoing conflicts between farmers and herders have deep historical roots. While these issues all contribute to a larger sense of fear, recent violence has been exacerbated by fresh complications. One of these is the fact that as a result of climate change, the grazing accessible to Fulani pastoralists is decreasing. In addition, some Fulani who have invaded from other parts of the country have realised that kidnapping is profitable and have begun to do it, often leaving their victims maimed in exchange for a ransom.

Ibarapa area is home to seven distinct communities: Igangan, Eruwa, Aiyete, Tapa, Idere, Igbo-Ora, and Lanlate. There are over 120 villages spread across the seven communities, and while the Yoruba make up the majority of the population, members of other ethnic groups are also present. The soil in the Ibarapa region is so rich in nutrients that it is widely believed to be responsible for the highest concentration of twin births in all of Nigeria. Native Americans have always celebrated the bounty of their expansive territory. They engage in farming, producing an abundance of food and cash crops that are shipped to other states in the south and west. For almost 40 years, the Ibarapa people have welcomed and welcomed herders from the north as guests. The herders settled in with their hosts and began raising cattle on the area's 2,496 square kilometres of land. There have been many mutually beneficial marriages and commercial partnerships between the two communities over the years. However, the oasis beneath which they lived peacefully appears to have shrivelled, and the two groups are now mortal foes. The locals have blamed the herders for crimes such as the looting and damage of farms, as well as kidnappings and rapes.

The Fulani people of Ibarapa are split into two groups. Some choose to make their homes in urban areas, where they may interact with the general populace and pursue careers unrelated to cattle farming. These Fulani rent or buy property in the centre of each town, where they then construct dwellings and farm plots. They have been there for a long time and have become fluent in Yoruba. The Fulani that are intermixed with local populations are generally well-behaved. The Fulani are divided into two groups, one of which consists primarily of core herders who have established villages on the forest's periphery. They are employed by principals to tend to their herds of cattle and make regular trips into town to stock up on supplies. They are also common sights on market days at the kara (cattle) market. Since these herders are rarely seen in public and

might be hostile, most people know very little about them. They are also said to be carrying lethal weaponry, such as AK-47s, while they roam the woods. They intentionally cause harm to farmers by grazing livestock on farms and then attacking the farmers. Fulani clan elders in Ibarapa are the ones who employ these herders. They also congregate in close-knit neighbourhoods on the outskirts of town. Seriki Saliu Abdulkadri and Iskilu Wakili are two prominent Ibarapa residents who hire herders.

Wakili, 70, claimed to have been in Ibarapa for more than 30 years, while Saliu, also 70, had resided in Igangan for around 40 years. Both men were major employers of herders in the Ibarapa village. Years ago, they started having problems when rumours spread that they had recruited herders from outside of Nigeria, particularly Mali, taking advantage of the country's lax immigration policies. Sunday Adeyemo, also known as Sunday Igboho, a prominent young leader, has issued an eviction notice to herders in the Ibarapa village, blaming them for the recent spate of violence between herders and farmers, rapes, and kidnappings. The notice gives the herders seven days to leave the community. Before the deadline passed, Seriki Saliu was forced to leave his home in the Alagolo region of Igangan, while Wakili was driven out of his Kajola community by a group of security men commanded by the Oodua Peoples Congress. Before Sunday Igboho stepped in, some young people in the towns had threatened to torch the palace of the King, the traditional ruler of Igangan, on the grounds that he had sold off the town's tranquilly to the Fulani in exchange for personal riches. The community's youth leader claimed that the young people had also threatened the local government chairman with expulsion.

The difficulties presented by porous borders and threats to human security in the Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria are enormous. In Table 2, 80 (28.0%) of the respondents strongly agreed to the assertion that less boundaries are demarcated along Ibarapa community of Oyo State with a complementary trend of 106 (37.1%) of the respondents that agreed to the assertion. While 83 (29.0%) of the respondents disagreed with the assertion with a corresponding trend of 16 (5.6%) of the respondents that strongly disagreed. About 1 representing (.3 %) of the respondents gave the assertion no response. The mean value and standard deviation ($\bar{X} = 2.1228$, SD = .88553) established this frequency distribution. The explanation of this distribution was that less boundaries were demarcated along Ibarapa community of Oyo State.

Also, respondents were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with the second assertion that there was lack of roads linking the communities and villages. In their response, an aggregate of 60 (21.0%) of the respondents strongly agreed to the assertion with a complementary trend of 120 (42.0%) of the respondents that agreed to the assertion. While 85 (29.7%) of the respondents disagreed with the assertion with a complementary trend of 21 (7.3%) of the respondents that strongly disagreed. The mean value and standard deviation ($\bar{X} = 2.2343$, SD = .86512) established this frequency distribution. The implication of this data was that there was lack of roads linking the communities and villages.

As shown by the third assertion in Table 2, this study investigated; the problems of border porosity and human security in the Ibarapa Community in Oyo State, Nigeria may be traced back to poor border management on the part of both Nigeria and the states that border the country.. This statistical finding revealed that 55 (19.2%) of the respondents strongly agreed to the assertion; with a complementary trend of 120 (42.0%) of the respondents that agreed to this view. While 82 (28.7%) of the respondents disagreed with the assertion with a complementary trend of 28 (9.8%) of the respondents that strongly disagreed. About 1 representing (.3 %) of the respondents gave the assertion no response. The mean value and standard deviation ($\bar{X} = 2.2912$, SD = .88975) established this frequency distribution. Based on this distribution, it was concluded that poor border management on the part of both Nigeria and the states surrounding the country contributed to the problems of border porosity and human security in the Ibarapa Community in the state of Oyo, Nigeria.

It was investigated in the fourth assertion that visas are frequently obtained through the use of fraudulent practises or forged documents, frequently in collaboration with immigration officials. In their reactions, 49 (17.1%) of the respondents strongly agreed with the assertion; with a complementary trend of 134 (46.9%) of the respondents that agreed to the assertion. While 85 (29.7%) of the respondents disagreed with the assertion with a complementary trend of 18 (6.3%) of the respondents that strongly disagreed. The mean value and standard deviation (\bar{X} = 2.2517, SD = .81192) confirmed this frequency distribution. The interpretation of this distribution was that visas are frequently obtained through the use of fraudulent practises or forged documents, frequently in collaboration with immigration officials.

The study showed how much they agreed or disagreed with the assertion that, In the Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria, the issues of border porosity and human security were mitigated by personnel that was ill-equipped, ill-trained, and uninspired for preventing cross-border crimes. Cross-border crime was one of the difficulties. To achieve this, respondents were asked to acknowledge the assertion. Reacting to this assertion, 27 (9.4%) of the respondents strongly agreed to the assertion with a complementary trend of 118 (41.3%) of the respondents that agreed to the assertion. While 112 (39.2%) of the respondents disagreed with the assertion with a complementary trend of 26 (9.1%) of the respondents that strongly disagreed. About 3 representing (1.0%) of the respondents gave no response to the assertion. The mean value and standard deviation ($\bar{X} = 2.4841$, SD = .79153) confirmed this frequency distribution. The interpretation of this distribution was that the respondents' response were very close to each other on the assertion that inadequate personnel that are ill-equipped, ill trained and unenthusiastic to avert cross-border crimes.

Also, 49 (17.1%) of the respondents strongly agreed with the argument that the issues of border vulnerability and human safety in the Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria were caused by a lack of suitable vehicles, motorbikes, and the absence of helicopters to patrol the boundaries. This is supported with a corresponding trend of 123 (43.0%) of the respondents that agreed to the assertion. On the other hand, just 85 (29.7%) of the respondents disagreed with the assertion with a complementary trend of 27 (9.4%) of the respondents that strongly disagreed. About 2 representing (.7%) of the respondents gave the view no response. The mean value and standard deviation ($\bar{X} = 2.3169$, SD = .86853) established this frequency distribution. The implications of this distribution were that the issues of border porosity and human security in the Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria, were exacerbated by a lack of suitable vehicles, motorbikes, and the non-availability of aircraft for surveillance of the borders.



Figure 1: Overview of Border Entrance in the Study Area

It was found that, massive movement of people out of their countries into Nigeria accounted for the challenges of border porosity and human security in Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria. In their reactions, 48 (16.8%) of the respondents strongly agreed to the assertion with a complementary trend of 122 (42.7%) of the respondents that agreed to the assertion. While 95 (33.2%) of the respondents disagreed with the assertion with a complementary trend of 21 (7.3%) of the respondents that strongly disagreed. The mean value and standard deviation ($\bar{X} = 2.3112$, SD = .83625) confirmed this frequency distribution. The explanation of this distribution was that massive movement of people out of their countries into Nigeria accounted for the challenges of border porosity and human security in Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria.

Also, 46 (16.1%) of the respondents strongly agreed to the assertion that the proliferation of illegal routes for criminal activities in and out of the country responsible the challenges of border porosity and human security in Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria with a complementary trend of 118 (41.3%) of the respondents that agreed to the assertion. While 100 (35.0%) of the respondents disagreed with the assertion and a complementary trend of 21 (7.3%) of the respondents that strongly disagreed. About 1 representing (.3 %) of the respondents gave no response to the assertion. The mean value and standard deviation ($\bar{x} = 2.3368$, SD = .83426) confirmed this frequency distribution. The interpretation of this distribution was that the

proliferation of illegal routes for criminal activities in and out of the country responsible the challenges of border porosity and human security in Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria.

Lastly, the respondents were asked whether Ibarapa Community in Oyo State, Nigeria is facing difficulties with border porosity and human security as a result of transnational criminal activities. These transnational criminal activities include, but are not limited to, rustling cattle, stealing automobiles, smuggling arms, ammunition, and goods, trafficking people, and terrorism, amongst others.. Reacting to this last assertion in Table 4.4, 44 (15.4%) of the respondents strongly agreed to the assertion with a complementary trend of 108 (37.8%) of the respondents that agreed to the assertion. While 96 (33.6%) of the respondents disagreed with the assertion with a complementary trend of 36 (12.6%) of the respondents that strongly disagreed. About 2 representing (0.7%) of the respondents gave no response to the assertion. The mean value and standard deviation ($\bar{X} = 2.4366$, SD = .90123) confirmed this frequency distribution. The implication of this distribution was that the problems of border porousness and human security in the Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria are caused by an increase in cross-border illicit activity such as cattle rustling, automobile theft, and smuggling of arms, ammunition, and commodities, as well as human trafficking as well as terrorist activity, among other things.

Table 2. The challenges of border porosity and human security in Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria

-	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Respons e	Descriptive Statistics N = 286	
Assertions	f (%)	f (%)	f (%)	f (%)	F (%)	Mean Value	Standard Deviation
Less boundaries are demarcated along Ibarapa community of Oyo State.	80 (28.0)	106 (37.1)	83 (29.0)	16 (5.6)	1 (.3)	2.1228	.88553
Lack of roads linking the communities and villages.	60 (21.0)	120 (42.0)	85 (29.7)	21 (7.3)	- (-)	2.2343	.86512
The surrounding states and Nigeria herself have done a poor job of managing the boundaries.	55 (19.2)	120 (42.0)	82 (28.7)	28 (9.8)	1 (.3)	2.2912	.88975
Insufficient manpower that lacks the motivation, training, and equipment to effectively prevent transnational crime.	27 (9.4)	118 (41.3)	112 (39.2)	26 (9.1)	3 (1.0)	2.4841	.79153
Forged or fraudulent visas are obtained, sometimes with the help of immigration officials.	49 (17.1)	134 (46.9)	85 (29.7)	18 (6.3)	2 (.7)	2.3169	.86853

Not enough cars, motorbikes, or helicopters are available for border enforcement.	49 (17.1)	123 (43.0)	85 (29.7)	27 (9.4)	(0,7)	2.3112	.83625
Massive movement of people out of their countries into Nigeria.	48 (16.8)	122 (42.7)	95 (33.2)	21 (7.3)	1 (.3)	2.3368	.83426
The proliferation of illegal routes for criminal activities in and out of the country.	46 (16.1)	118 (41.3)	100 (35.0)	21 (7.3)	1 (.3)	2.2351	.84180
There has been an uptick in crimes that span international borders, such as cattle rustling, car theft, the illegal importation of goods, terrorism, and people trafficking.	44 (15.4)	108 (37.8)	96 (33.6)	36 (12.6)	2 (.7)	2.4366	.90123

Source: Field Survey, 2024

Discussion

The study found out that borders community was used as transit for smuggling arms by smugglers; absence of successful monitoring by security agents; corrupt engagements of the security officials at the borders community; lack of clear delimitation and demarcation create tension within the borders community in Ibarapa area; foreign criminals easily enter Ibarapa and the rest of Nigeria, adding to the region's already terrifying crime rate. The rise of globalisation pushed the opening of borders of countries throughout the world, the rise of trans-border crimes; high increase in smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons; increasing in numerous illegal routes created by smuggling entrepreneurs in connivance with security personnel; and high rate of transnational organised crimes carried out along the borders of the country. The findings of this study are complemented by Mark and Iwebi (2019) which emphasised on the Nigerian security agencies, and other joint border security patrol are constantly running battles with smugglers, traffickers especially in making sure that the environment are free of despicable activities.

Moreover, the analysis also showed that there was the influx of unchecked and undocumented migrants has continued to pose unsalutary effects on Ibarapa communities and villages. The challenges of border porosity and human security in Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria include the fact that less boundaries are demarcated along Ibarapa community of Oyo State. This is followed by inadequate border management on the part of Nigeria and her neighbouring states.

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation

This study provided background information on the border porosity and human security in Ibarapa Community of Oyo State Nigeria. It explicated the thread of border porosity, light arms proliferation and human security along Ibarapa Community of Oyo State, Nigeria and investigated the challenges of border porosity and human security in the study area. Investigating the consequences of these challenges became significant because border porosity are still very susceptible to numerous arms proliferations emanating from poor mismanagement of the borders by the states bordering Nigeria and Nigeria herself.

The influx of unchecked and undocumented migrants has continued to pose unsalutary effects on Nigeria's national security as many foreigners were fingered as mercenaries in the recent Fulani herders and farmers conflicts in some part of Ibarapa Community in Oyo State Nigeria. Also, it is interesting to know that some members of Fulani herders while having their houses on one side of the community across the Ibarapa communities, they simultaneously have their farmlands on the other side of the thick bushes across the communities, which makes their daily activities sometimes illegal. Therefore, guarding a country's borders is an extremely important job that must be given top priority in order to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens.

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